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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 Canterbury Coal Co. petitioned for review of the Benefit Review Board’s order 
affirming an award of Black Lung benefits to a former coal miner, Leo Chemelli.  
Canterbury asserts the Administrative Law Judge made a causation finding in Chemelli’s 
prior benefits claim that precluded the instant award, and that this subsequent claim was 
not supported by new evidence.  It also argued that the allowance of successive claims for 
benefits, after prior denials, deprived Canterbury of due process, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, because it ignored the principle of finality.  
We will deny the petition.   
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 As this opinion is not precedential, we presume the parties’ knowledge of the 
record and will set forth only those facts that are necessary to explain our decision.  
Chemelli worked in the coal mines for thirty-nine years.  He filed the first of four 
unsuccessful claims for benefits on August 2, 1988.  The Administrative Law Judge 
initially denied Chemelli’s fifth claim, ruling that the record did not support a diagnosis 
of clinical pneumoconiosis.  Upon remand from the Board, the Administrative Law Judge 
held in 2005 that Chemelli’s record both established a change in condition of entitlement 
and supported a diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis.    
 Canterbury first asserts error by the Board because, it claims, the Administrative 
Law Judge determined in the adjudication of Chemelli’s fourth claim that the source of 
total disability was non-occupational adult onset asthma.  Canterbury argues that this 
collaterally estops adjudication on the etiology of Chemelli’s disease.  However, the 
Board correctly stated that the Administrative Law Judge “did not definitively determine 
the etiology of [Chemelli’s] respiratory impairment, nor was he required to do so.”  It 
was enough to note that Chemelli’s fourth claim failed because he had not met his burden 
of proof in establishing the existence of pneumoconiosis.  The Board properly decided 
that such a holding allowed Chemelli to submit a subsequent claim based upon new 
evidence of a change in one of the applicable conditions of entitlement, pursuant to 20 
C.F.R. § 725.309(d).    
 Canterbury also challenges the Board’s conclusion that the Administrative Law 
Judge’s decision was based upon new evidence of a change of condition of entitlement.  
Canterbury argues that, to meet the requirements for a subsequent claim, the evidence 
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must show a physical change in Chemelli’s health.  However, the Board correctly held 
that evidence substantiating a diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis was a change in one of 
the applicable conditions of entitlement.  See Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 
308, 318 (3d Cir. 1995).  In particular, the Board considered the fact that the 
Administrative Law Judge reviewed newly submitted medical opinions of five doctors.  
He credited the opinion of Dr. Cohen, who examined Chemelli and diagnosed legal and 
clinical pneumoconiosis based upon a number of factors, including a decreasing diffusion 
capacity.  Thus, Canterbury’s argument has no merit.   
 Finally, Canterbury argues that the allowance of subsequent Black Lung claims 
after prior denials violates due process because it prevents finality in claims.  This 
ignores, however, the prerequisites for subsequent claims set out in the regulations, 
requiring that claims made over one year after the filing of the first claim can only be 
brought upon evidence of a change in a condition of entitlement.  20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).  
As we said:  “new facts . . . may give rise to a new claim, which is not precluded by the 
earlier judgment.”  Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 314.  This is consistent with the 
generally accepted understanding of pneumoconiosis as a “latent and progressive 
disease,” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(c), and with the liberal construction that we have 
historically given to the Black Lung entitlement program so that Congress’ remedial 
intent might be fully respected.  See Keating v. Director, Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1122 (3d Cir. 1995).  Each subsequent claim, 
therefore, is distinct.  As a result, Canterbury’s due process claim is meritless.   
 For all of these reasons, we will deny Canterbury’s petition for review.  
